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[701] 
No Harm, Still Foul: When an Injury-in-fact 
Materializes in a Consumer Data Breach 
BENJAMIN C. WEST* 
In the consumer data breach context, courts have seemingly limited a plaintiff’s ability 
to bring suit by applying the standing doctrine’s injury-in-fact requirement too 
rigidly. This is unacceptable, as the law of standing should not leave consumers 
without technology, without security, and without recourse. This Note challenges how 
courts currently apply the injury-in-fact element in consumer data breach actions, 
and proposes a new standard that better understands and considers previously 
overlooked harms that are incurred upon a breach. 
 
This Note proceeds in four parts. Part I describes how courts currently approach 
standing in consumer data breach actions. Part II illuminates a plethora of real harms 
that current approaches fail to consider. Part III addresses foreseeable 
counterarguments. Lastly, Part IV urges courts to consider reforming current 
approaches by stressing how a better understanding of what constitutes a sufficient 
harm will ultimately provide adequate recourse to harmed consumers. 
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INTRODUCTION 
Despite the valiant efforts of many of our parents and grandparents 
to resist technological advancements, it is safe to say that technology has 
carried the day. Thirty years ago, phones were the size of bricks, record 
stores were still profitable, online-dating did not exist, and people still 
had to leave the house to buy groceries. Today is quite different. As an 
example, the phone currently in your pocket is more technologically 
powerful than every single NASA computer used to get Neil Armstrong 
to the moon.1 
Technologic advancement comes with both benefits and new risks 
of harm. Technology is part of everything we do now. Personal 
information appears throughout emails, social media pages, and texts. 
Scores of businesses maintain your credit or debit card information. 
Whether you ordered a pizza online last week, bought new socks off of 
Amazon, or decided to take an Uber into work this morning, chances are, 
the information stored securely in your wallet is not as secure as you 
think. 
The biggest risk to stored consumer information is a data breach. As 
the Third Circuit said, arguably with only modest overstatement, “[t]here 
are only two types of companies left in the United States, according to 
data security experts: ‘those that have been hacked and those that [do 
 
 1. Tibi Puiu, Your Smartphone Is Millions of Times More Powerful than All of NASA’s 
Combined Computing in 1969 (Sept. 10, 2017, 1:53 PM), ZME SCI., www.zmescience.com/ 
research/technology/smartphone-power-compared-to-apollo-432.  
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not] know [they have] been hacked.’”2 In fact, in 2014, it was reported 
that as many as “43% of companies have experienced a data 
breach . . . . Even worse, the absolute size of the breaches [has been] 
increasing exponentially.”3 Recent statistics have found that individuals 
who have been the victim of a data breach are nine and a half times more 
likely to become the victim of identity theft.4 
When a data breach occurs, various laws provide consumers with 
the ability to seek redress against the companies that failed to protect 
their information. However, recent cases have limited a plaintiff’s ability 
to bring suit in federal court by rigidly applying the standing doctrine’s 
injury-in-fact requirement to consumer data breach suits. 
Though the United States Supreme Court announced in Clapper  
v. Amnesty International USA that allegations of potential harm must be 
“certainly impending” to state a justiciable case,5 this standard severely 
understates certain real harms attributable to data breaches. In 2016, the 
Supreme Court in Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins had a chance to remedy the 
nearsightedness of Clapper, but the Court avoided deciding the issue 
entirely.6 
The purpose of this Note is not to attack the standing doctrine, but 
rather to challenge how some courts currently apply the injury-in-fact 
element in consumer data breach suits. This Note urges a different 
understanding of injury-in-fact in relation to consumer data breach 
cases: one that recognizes the real financial risks and psychological 
harms to consumers. Specifically, the injury-in-fact requirement should 
be applied with the understanding that a breach in and of itself is an 
actual harm to consumers who are currently forced to use technology 
without sufficient protection. This standard will allow consumers who 
are harmed in less tangible and physical ways to have opportunities to 
seek redress. In the case of a data breach, the law of standing ought not 
leave consumers without technology, without security, and without 
recourse. 
This Note defends its proposed thesis in four parts. Part I describes 
how courts currently approach standing in consumer data breach suits. 
Part II illuminates a plethora of very real harms that these current 
approaches fail to consider. Part III addresses foreseeable 
 
 2. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 360 (M.D. Pa. 2015) (quoting Nicole Perlroth, The 
Year in Hacking, by the Numbers, N.Y. TIMES (Apr. 22, 2013, 9:10 PM), 
http://bits.blogs.nytimes.com/2013/04/22/the-year-in-hacking-by-the-numbers/?_r=0). 
 3. Storm, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 360–61 (citing Elizabeth Weise, 43% of Companies Had a Data 
Breach in the Past Year, USA TODAY (Sept. 24, 2014), http://www.usatoday.com/story/tech/2014/ 
09/24/data-breach-companies-60/16106197). 
 4. Identity ShieldIdentity Theft Statistics, STARR WRIGHT USA, http://test.wrightusa.com/ 
products/wright-identity-shield/statistics (last visited Jan. 20, 2018). 
 5. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). 
 6. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1553 (2016). 
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counterarguments. Lastly, Part IV urges courts to consider reforming 
current approaches to the injury-in-fact element of standing as it relates 
to consumer data breach cases. The Note concludes by stressing how a 
better understanding of what constitutes a sufficient harm in consumer 
data breach suits will ultimately provide adequate recourse to harmed 
consumers. 
I.  THE CURRENT APPROACH TO STANDING IN  
CONSUMER DATA BREACH SUITS 
A. THE ROAD TO CLAPPER 
Article III, Section 2 of the United States Constitution authorizes 
federal courts to adjudicate only actual “cases” and “controversies.”7 The 
Supreme Court has interpreted these words as prescribing judicial 
limitations on the types of cases that can be brought before a court. The 
standing doctrine is the most notable of these limits. Standing has been 
understood as the determination of whether a specific person is the 
proper party to bring a matter to the court for adjudication.8 “Current 
standing doctrine purports to ask . . . whether plaintiffs have an adequate 
stake in seeking judicial relief.”9 Standing prohibits courts from issuing 
advisory opinions and from hearing moot or unripe cases.10 
A plaintiff must show three elements to have standing.11 First, a 
plaintiff must have suffered an actual injury.12 Second, a plaintiff must 
allege that the injury is fairly traceable to the defendant’s conduct.13 
Third, a plaintiff must allege that a favorable court decision is likely to 
redress the injury.14 Importantly, the burden is on the plaintiff to satisfy 
these elements.15 
The most prominent issue of standing, as applied to consumer data 
breach cases, concerns the injury element. A standing injury requires “an 
invasion of a legally protected interest which is (a) concrete and 
 
 7. U.S. CONST. art. III, § 2. 
 8. See Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 750–51 (1984) (quoting Warth v. Seldin, 422 U.S. 490, 498 
(1975)) (“In essence the question of standing is whether [a] litigant is entitled to have [a] court decide 
the merits of the dispute or of particular issues.” (internal quotations omitted)). 
 9. Richard M. Re, Relative Standing, 102 GEO. L.J. 1191, 1191 (2014). 
 10. Evan Tsen Lee, Deconstitutionalizing Justiciability: The Example of Mootness, 105 HARV. L. 
REV. 605, 606 (1992). 
 11. This Note only addresses the standing doctrine’s constitutional requirements, and does not 
discuss any potential prudential requirements. 
 12. See Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 13. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 590 (Blackmun, J., dissenting). 
 14. Id. at 561. 
 15. See id. at 566 (quoting United States v. Students Challenging Regulatory Agency Procedures 
(“SCRAP”), 412 U.S. 669, 688 (1973)) (“Standing is not ‘an ingenious academic exercise in the 
conceivable,’ but [instead] requires . . . a factual showing of perceptible harm.”). 
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particularized . . . and (b) actual or imminent.”16 A plaintiff’s alleged 
injury “must be . . . distinct and palpable, and not abstract or conjectural 
or hypothetical.”17 More specifically, most courts grapple with the issue 
of whether an alleged risk of future harm caused by a data breach is a 
sufficient injury-in-fact. A majority of courts have held that where a 
plaintiff fails to allege an injury that is either “actual or imminent,” there 
is no standing under Article III.18 Nevertheless, a number of 
“courts . . . have held that the injury-in-fact requirement can be satisfied 
by a threat of future harm or by any act that harms plaintiff only by 
increasing the risk of future harm that plaintiff would have otherwise 
faced, absent defendant’s actions.”19 A notable example of this is 
illustrated by Massachusetts v. EPA, where the Supreme Court held that 
Massachusettsas well as other stateshad suffered a sufficient injury-
in-fact in order to proceed in a suit against the Environmental Protection 
Agency (“EPA”) for failing to regulate carbon dioxide and other 
greenhouse gases as pollutants.20 In holding that plaintiffs had standing, 
the Court stressed that “the rise in sea levels associated with global 
warming has already harmed and will continue to harm [states]. The risk 
of catastrophic harm, though remote, is nevertheless real.”21 
The Supreme Court’s prominent Clapper opinion addressed what 
kind of future harm satisfies the injury-in-fact element of standing in 
relation to government surveillance suits.22 In Clapper, attorneys and 
human rights, labor, legal, and media organizations challenged section 
702 of the Foreign Intelligence Surveillance Act, which authorized 
governmental surveillance of non-U.S. persons “reasonably believed to 
be located outside of the United States.”23 In asserting that Article III 
standing was met, the plaintiffs argued that the nature of their work 
“require[d] them to engage in sensitive international communications 
with . . . likely targets” of the Act, and that there was an “objectively 
reasonable likelihood that their communications [would] be 
acquired . . . at some point in the future.”24 The Court rejected this 
argument, stressing that there was no evidence that plaintiffs had been 
placed under surveillance and the fact that plaintiffs could be surveilled 
at some point in the future was insufficient.25 The Court maintained that 
 
 16. Id. at 560 (quoting Whitmore v. Arkansas, 495 U.S. 149, 155 (1990)) (internal quotations 
omitted). 
 17. Allen v. Wright, 468 U.S. 737, 751 (1984) (citation and internal quotations omitted). 
 18. Lujan, 504 U.S. at 560. 
 19. DAVID BENDER, COMPUTER LAW: A GUIDE TO CYBERLAW AND DATA PRIVACY LAW § 31.03 
(Matthew Bender ed., rev. ed. 2017).  
 20. Massachusetts v. Envtl. Prot. Agency, 549 U.S. 497, 498 (2007). 
 21. Id. at 526. 
 22. Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l, USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1142 (2013). 
 23. Id. (citing 50 U.S.C. § 1881a (2006)). 
 24. Clapper, 133 S. Ct. at 1142. 
 25. Id. at 1148. 
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plaintiffs’ theory of future injury was “too speculative to satisfy the  
well-established requirement that threatened injury must be ‘certainly 
impending.”26 The Court held that allegations of future harm can only 
establish Article III standing if the alleged harm is “certainly 
impending.”27 For the Court, “allegations of possible future injury are not 
sufficient.”28 
The plaintiffs in Clapper alternatively argued that they had suffered 
present injury because the risk of surveillance had already “forced them 
to take costly and burdensome measures to protect the confidentiality of 
their international communications.”29 In rejecting this argument, the 
Supreme Court held that plaintiffs could not “manufacture standing by 
choosing to make expenditures based on hypothetical future harm that is 
not certainly impending.”30 
The Supreme Court has not yet explained how far Clapper extends. 
In Spokeo, a Virginia man named Thomas Robins (“plaintiff”) brought 
suit against a “people search engine” company (Spokeo), when the 
company published false information about him.31 The false information 
indicated that plaintiff was wealthy, married with children, and worked 
in a professional or technical field.32 In fact, plaintiff was not married, 
did not have children, and was unemployed and looking for work.33 The 
issue before the Court was whether a plaintiff has standing when a web 
company posts incorrect information about him, where the harm has yet 
to materialize. The Court did not answer that question but instead, in a 
6-2 decision, concluded that the Ninth Circuit had failed to consider 
standing fully.34 The Court remanded the case to allow the Ninth Circuit 
to apply the injury-in-fact requirement in the first instance.35 However, 
in her dissent, Justice Ginsburg stated that the plaintiff had alleged a 
sufficient injury-in-fact because Spokeo’s misrepresentation of personal 
details had harmed plaintiff’s job prospects.36 
B. CLAPPER APPLIED 
Although Clapper was not a consumer data breach case, courts have 
applied the Clapper standard to consumer data breach suits.37 For 
 
 26. Id. at 1143. 
 27. Id. 
 28. Id. at 1147 n. 9. 
 29. Id. at 1143. 
 30. Id. 
 31. Spokeo, Inc. v. Robins, 136 S. Ct. 1540, 1543 (2016). 
 32. Id. at 1546. 
 33. Id. 
 34. Id. at 1553. 
 35. Id. at 1554. 
 36. Id. at 1555 (Ginsburg, J., dissenting). 
 37. Both the Second and Fourth Circuits have relied on Clapper in finding allegations of increased 
risk of harm insufficient to confer standing. See King & Spalding, D.C. Circuit Revives Data Breach 
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example, in Whalen v. Michaels Stores Inc., a trial court in the Second 
District followed Clapper in finding a lack of standing in a suit where 
customers alleged an increased risk of future harm.38 There, Michaels 
notified customers of “possible fraudulent activity” on some of Michaels’ 
customers’ credit cards whose data Michaels kept and maintained.39 
Three months later, Michaels confirmed the existence of a security 
breach.40 According to the company’s press release, hackers used 
malicious software to retrieve the credit card information from the 
systems of Michaels stores and its subsidiary, Aaron Brothers.41 Michaels 
estimated that approximately 2.6 million credit or debit cards may have 
been affected during the time period of the alleged breach.42 Whalen 
alleged that she had suffered damages arising out of “costs associated 
with identity theft and the increased risk of identity theft,” namely, lost 
time and money associated with credit monitoring and other risk-
mitigation efforts, though she conceded that “fraudulent use of cards 
might not be apparent for years.”43 
Applying Clapper, the court rejected Whalen’s argument and held 
that she lacked standing, reasoning that plaintiffs “cannot manufacture 
standing” through credit monitoring.44 The court maintained that “[i]f 
the law were otherwise, an enterprising plaintiff would be able to secure 
a lower standard for Article III standing simply by making an 
expenditure based on a nonparanoid fear.”45 
Similarly, in Storm v. Paytime, Inc., a district court judge found a 
lack of standing based on Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard in a 
class action suit against a payroll service company.46 There, a data breach 
exposed employees’ confidential personal and financial information, 
including full legal names, addresses, bank-account information, social 
security numbers, and dates of birth.47 Although the breach occurred on 
April 7, 2014, the defendant did not discover the breach until April 30, 
2014.48 Moreover, the defendant waited until May 12, 2014 to begin 
notifying affected employers of the breach.49 The plaintiffs in Storm 
claimed “that nationally, over 233,000 individuals had their personal 
 
Putative Class Action on Standing Grounds, Widens Circuit Split, JD SUPRA (Aug.  
22, 2017), www.jdsupra.com/legalnews/d-c-circuit-revives-data-breach-78728. 
 38. Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 577, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2015). 
 39. Id. at 578. 
 40. Id. 
 41. Id. 
 42. Id. 
 43. Id. at 579. 
 44. Id. at 581. 
 45. Id. 
 46. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 364 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 
 47. Id. at 363. 
 48. Id. 
 49. Id. 
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and financial information ‘misappropriated’ as a result of the breach of 
[defendant’s] computer network.”50 They brought suit alleging that as a 
result of the data breach, “they . . . have spent, or will need to spend, time 
and money to protect themselves from identity theft.”51 
The plaintiffs also asserted present damages.52 One class 
membera government employee who needed security clearance to 
perform his jobhad his security clearance suspended as a result of the 
breach and was required to work at a different job site which resulted in 
a four hour increase in his daily commute.53 He alleged that the increased 
commute caused him to incur travel expenses and lost time.54 
In dismissing the suit for lack of standing, the court embraced 
Clapper by finding “no factual allegation of misuse or that such misuse is 
certainly impending.”55 The court found that plaintiffs did not allege that 
their bank accounts had been accessed, that credit cards had been opened 
in their names, or that unknown third parties had used their social 
security numbers to impersonate them and gain access to their 
accounts.56 “In sum, their credit information and bank accounts look the 
same today as they did prior to [defendant’s] data breach.”57 
Many courts have agreed that, following Clapper, increased risk 
alone cannot meet the injury-in-fact requirement in consumer data 
breach cases because the harm is “merely speculative.”58 However, some 
courts have approached the issue differently.59 Notably, the Seventh 
Circuit, in In re Adobe Systems Privacy Litigation, distinguished 
Clapper in a consumer data breach suit and refused to apply its “certainly 
impending” standard.60 “Unlike in Clapper, where respondents’ claim 
that they would suffer future harm rested on a chain of events that was 
both ‘highly attenuated’ and ‘highly speculative,’” the court found that 
“the risk that Plaintiffs’ personal data will be misused by the hackers who 
breached Adobe’s network is immediate and very real.”61 
Similarly, in Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Group, LLC, the Seventh 
Circuit again distinguished the harms alleged in Clapper from the harms 
 
 50. Id. 
 51. Id. 
 52. Id. at 364. 
 53. Id. 
 54. Id. 
 55. Id. at 366. 
 56. Id. 
 57. Id. 
 58. See, e.g., Strautins v. Trustwave Holdings, Inc., 27 F. Supp. 3d 871 (N.D. Ill. 2014) (Clapper 
compels rejection of [plaintiff’s] claim that an increased risk of identity theft is sufficient to satisfy the 
injury-in-fact requirement for standing.”). 
 59. The Sixth, Seventh, Ninth and D.C. Circuits have all held that increased risk of harm is 
sufficient for standing purposes. King & Spalding, supra note 37. 
 60. In re Adobe Sys., Inc. Privacy Litigation, 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197 (N.D. Cal. 2014). 
 61. Id. at 1214. 
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alleged in a consumer data breach suit.62 In Remijas, 350,000 account 
cards were potentially exposed to malicious malware that infiltrated 
Neiman Marcus’s computer systems.63 Over 9000 of those cards were 
then used fraudulently.64 In finding that those consumers who had 
alleged only imminent future injuries had standing, the court 
emphasized that plaintiffs in a data theft case are differently situated 
from the plaintiffs in Clapper.65 In particular, the victims of the Neiman 
Marcus data breach did not “need to speculate as to whether [their] 
information [had] been stolen . . . .”66 Both parties agreed that the 
information had been taken, and for the court, this was sufficient.67 The 
court found that “[defendant’s] customers should not have to wait until 
hackers commit identity theft or credit card fraud in order to give the 
class standing, because there is an ‘objectively reasonable likelihood’ that 
such an injury will occur.”68 The court stated that “[p]resumably, the 
purpose of the hack [was], sooner or later, to make fraudulent charges or 
[to] assume [plaintiffs’] identities.”69 In maintaining that there was an 
“objectively reasonable likelihood” that identity theft would occur to all 
consumers involved in the consumer data breach, the court rhetorically 
asked: “Why else would hackers break into a store’s database and steal 
consumers’ private information?”70 Given this important notion, the 
court found that plaintiffs’ “allegations of future injury are sufficient” to 
establish standing.71 
Other courts have found that allegations of a substantial risk of 
harm, along with reasonably incurred mitigation costs following a data 
breach, are sufficient to establish a cognizable injury and confer standing 
under Article III. For example, in Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual 
Insurance Co., the Sixth Circuit found that various costs (in both time 
and money) commonly incurred by victims of identity theft and fraud are 
sufficient to satisfy the injury-in-fact standing requirement.72 The court 
there stated that “[w]here [p]laintiffs already know that they have lost 
control of their data, it would be unreasonable to expect [them] to wait 
for actual misusea fraudulent charge on a credit card, for 
examplebefore taking steps to ensure their own personal and financial 
 
 62. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015). 
 63. Id. at 690. 
 64. Id. 
 65. Id. at 693. 
 66. Id. 
 67. Id. 
 68. Id. (quoting Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013)). 
 69. Remijas, 794 F.3d at 693. 
 70. Id. 
 71. Id. at 694. 
 72. Galaria v. Nationwide Mutual Ins. Co., Nos. 15-3386/3387, 2016 U.S. App. LEXIS 16840, at 
*9 (6th Cir. Sep. 12, 2016). 
K – WEST_9 (FINAL) (DO NOT DELETE) 2/10/2018  10:07 AM 
710 HASTINGS LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 69:701 
security.”73 For the court, “these [preventative] costs are a concrete injury 
suffered to mitigate an imminent harm, and satisfy the injury 
requirement of Article III standing.”74 
II.  RETHINKING INJURY IN CONSUMER DATA-BREACH SUITS 
Neither the majority nor the minority position has it completely 
right. Both camps fail to appreciate that consumer data breach victims 
suffer both a credible risk of future injury and a concrete present injury, 
and that these injuries are sufficient to confer standing, even under 
Clapper. 
Clapper drew a distinction between “certainly impending” and 
merely “possible” future harm. Critically, though Clapper was a 
government surveillance case, there was no allegation that the plaintiffs 
were under surveillance.75 The plaintiffs argued that the type of work they 
engaged in made it objectively reasonable that their communications 
would eventually be subject to government surveillance, but the Court 
concluded that the likelihood of surveillance was “too speculative” to be 
considered an actual harm under the standing doctrine.76 Further, there 
was no concrete present injury in Clapper, but the Court stated that 
actual unlawful surveillance alone would have been a sufficient harm.77 
In the consumer data breach context, by contrast, possible risk of 
harm is not speculative. When a consumer data breach occurs, it means 
that someone has deliberately taken consumer information for misuse. 
Breaches do not occur randomly. Data thieves steal information to use it. 
Even if the stolen data is not used for a number of yearsor even if it is 
not used at allthis does not discount the fact that private information 
is in the wrong hands and consumers are forced to live with a heightened 
risk of identity theft. 
Further, consumer data breach victims suffer actual present harm. 
Unlike the plaintiffs in Clapper, who had not yet been surveilled, a data 
breach victim’s privacy has been breached. Victims of a data breach suffer 
several present injuries, including financial loss associated with attempts 
to mitigate the risk of identity theft, lost time, and psychological harms 
that arise from the breach itself. 
A. FUTURE RISK OF INJURY 
No one questions whether respondents’ communications in Clapper 
would have been surveilled at some point, given that respondents were 
lawyers and rights organizations who spoke regularly to persons the Act 
 
 73. Id. at *10. 
 74. Id. at *11. 
 75. See Clapper v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1141 (2013). 
 76. Id. at 1143. 
 77. Id. at 1153. 
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was created to target. As such, Clapper arguably was wrongly decided. 
However, even if Clapper was correctly decided, the “certainly 
impending” standard is misapplied in the consumer data breach context 
because its application severely understates very real harms. In a 
consumer data breach suit, a breach has occurred. Private information is 
no longer secure. It is no longer in the hands of the entities charged with 
protecting it. Instead, it is in the hands of people who ultimately plan to 
use it for personal gain. As such, a future risk of harm ceases to be 
speculative once there has been a data breach. Once a breach occurs, 
there is an objectively reasonable likelihood that the information has or 
will ultimately end up in the wrong person’s hands. 
That the risk may be small does not make it too speculative to confer 
standing, either. The degree of risk will likely be considered in 
determining proper damages; however, even a small risk of identity theft 
should constitute actual harm for standing purposes. Any heightened 
risk creates a fear that is objectively reasonable. The fact that consumers 
may never suffer financial harm does not discount the fact that 
consumers will undoubtedly respond to the heightened risk in ways that 
reflect sufficient actual harms. Critics could rightfully argue that the risk 
is still a question of whether, not when, consumers will incur  
non-financial harms resulting from consumer data breach. However, 
Subpart B of this Part importantly shows that there are property and 
privacy rights that presume actual harm as soon as a breach occurs, 
regardless of whether the data is fraudulently used. 
Further, Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard cannot exclude a 
data breach risk of future harm just because the risk is long-term. A risk 
that was not present before is a harm. As such, long-term risk is still an 
actual harm. Unlike a claim against a thief for future misuse, here, 
companies are data-confidants who breached their duty to keep private 
information secure. Consumers do not really have a choice in releasing 
their private information to companies. As such, the injury caused by the 
failures of companies to protect confidential information is ripe 
immediately upon a data breach. Just like business partners can be 
jointly and severally liable,78 here too the companies do not escape 
liability just because identity thieves are equally or more blameworthy. 
As discussed later, when individuals believe they are at risk of harm, it 
can have negative psychological effects. People respond differently when 
there is a risk of harm, as opposed to when they feel secure. As an 
illustration, many individuals will stick to the beaten path even though 
traveling via new terrain could lead them to their destination in less time. 
Lost time is an actual harm and the risk of the unknown is what led to the 
lost time here. In the consumer data breach context, having to take extra 
 
 78. See Nat’l Biscuit Co. v. Stroud, 106 S.E.2d 692 (N.C. 1959). 
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precautions because a data thief mishandled a victim’s personal 
information is not speculative, unnecessary, or irrational. It is how the 
vast majority of people act in these situations, and it is in itself actual 
harm. 
A consumer data breach creates a risk that was not present before. 
In demanding that a risk be likely to happen sooner rather than later in 
order to constitute an actual harm, the Clapper “certainly impending” 
standard and others disregard the actual harm that occurs simply by 
being subjected to a new risk. Courts should not even assess whether a 
risk is “certainly impending” or “substantial” enough. Instead, courts 
should only consider whether a new risk to a consumer has been created 
by the breach. 
Simply put, a “certainly impending” standardat least as it is 
applied to data breach casesmisunderstands that any risk of future 
harm is an actual harm incurred by consumers. Clapper’s “certainly 
impending” standard makes it almost impossible for plaintiffs to bring 
consumer data breach suits by forcing them to wait until the harm 
materializes into some tangible or physical harm. This flawed 
understanding of what constitutes a sufficient injury-in-fact creates a 
host of issues. Importantly, by forcing consumers to wait until harm 
materializes into a tangible or physical harm, injured consumers risk not 
being able to pursue recompense at all. 
To illustrate this, “the more time that passes between a data breach 
and an instance of identity theft, the more latitude a defendant has to 
argue that the identity theft is not ‘fairly traceable’ to the defendant’s data 
breach.”79 The words “fairly traceable” here serve to ensure that the 
causal connection between action and injury is sufficient.80 If a consumer 
has to wait for a harm to “materialize,” as each year passes, it becomes 
easier for defendant companies to argue that the harm is not a result of 
the data breach. In essence, the result means that consumers who are 
actually harmed by data breaches have no opportunity to seek reprieve. 
Take, for example, Target’s 2013 consumer data breach, where tens of 
thousands of customers’ account information details were taken.81 When 
a data breach of that magnitude occurs, attackers likely cannot use the 
stolen information over the course of twenty-four hours. Depending on 
how much data is taken, it could be years before breached information is 
misused. If the Target consumers are forced to wait until they are able to 
prove that fraudulent identity theft has occurred or is otherwise 
 
 79. Remijas v. Neiman Marcus Grp., LLC, 794 F.3d 688, 693 (7th Cir. 2015) (quoting In re Adobe 
Sys., 66 F. Supp. 3d 1197, 1215 (N.D. Cal. 2014)) (citation omitted). 
 80. Lujan v. Defs. of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560 (1992). 
 81. Jim Finkle & Dhanya Skariachan, Target Cyber Breach Hits 40 Million Payment Cards at 
Holiday Peak, REUTERS (Dec. 18, 2013, 4:05 PM), www.reuters.com/article/us-target-breach-idUSB 
RE9BH1GX20131219.  
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“certainly impending,” their case becomes infinitely harder to prove. In a 
situation like this, there is nothing to stop Target from claiming the 
breach was years ago and the information could have been obtained from 
any number of places. This is flawed justice as it lets companies avoid 
liability even though consumers were harmed as a direct result of their 
negligence in protecting private information. If the attackers do not use 
the obtained information for a decade or more, this does not discount the 
fact that it was because of Target’s failure to protect consumer account 
information that the attackers had obtained the ability to use the 
information in the first place. What Clapper’s “certainly impending” 
standard does is discount the real harms that consumers incur, such that 
entities like Target are able to build defenses based on the amount of time 
that has passed between the breach and the fraudulent activity. 
Additionally, a standard that forces consumers to wait until a risk is 
“certainly impending” or more tangible creates the possibility that people 
will not be able to seek redress for their injuries. This is especially true 
since many states have a seemingly short statute of limitations for 
identity theft cases.82 For example, in California, the statute of 
limitations for identity theft cases is four years, and begins to run as soon 
as the crime is discovered.83 To illustrate the gravity of the issue this 
creates, in Storm, it was ultimately determined that an estimated 
233,000 consumers had their private information stolen by the breach.84 
As such, depending on the number of culprits, it is likely impossible to 
fraudulently use every individual consumer’s data within a four year 
period. 
Applying the Clapper standard to consumer data breach suits 
creates a very real threat by making it immensely difficult for consumers 
to bring suits within the limitations period. Under the Clapper standard, 
plaintiff consumerswhen they are finally able to have standing at some 
point in the futuresuffer the possibility of being barred by a short 
statute of limitations; all because Clapper made an allegation of 
increased risk of harm insufficient to satisfy the  
injury-in-fact standing requirement. 
B. PRESENT INJURIES 
In addition to a risk of future harm, consumer data breach victims 
suffer a number of actual present injuries such as presumed harm, 
financial harm, lost time, and psychological harm. These are actual 
harms that occur immediately upon a consumer data breach. 
 
 82. See, e.g., CAL. PENAL CODE § 803, A.B. 1105 (West 2017); TEX. CODE CRIM. PRO. ANN. art. 
12.01(3)(G) (West 2017). 
 83. CAL. PENAL CODE § 803, A.B. 1105 (West 2017). 
 84. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 363 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 
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1.   Presumed Harm 
Using a “certainly impending” standard to determine whether an 
alleged risk of future harm satisfies the injury-in-fact element of standing 
in consumer data breach suits further misses the point because even 
though an alleged risk of future harm in and of itself is an actual harm, 
we need not look that far. Even if there is no risk of future harm, the 
infringement of important legal rights presumes an actual harm. 
The law recognizes this principle in a wide range of contexts, 
including battery, slander per se, and trespass. Take battery for instance. 
In Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Communications, Inc., a talk show host lit 
a cigar and intentionally and repeatedly blew smoke in the face of an 
appearing guest who happened to be a nationally known antismoking 
advocate.85 The guest sued for battery alleging that the host blowing 
smoke in his face was “for the purpose of causing physical discomfort, 
humiliation, and distress.”86 The court, in finding a valid claim, held that 
“[c]ontact which is offensive to a reasonable sense of personal dignity is 
offensive contact” for battery purposes.87 
Additionally, certain language in and of itself is actionable as slander 
per se without proof of special damages.88 A notable example is situations 
where a person is falsely accused of having committed a crime. Further 
still, courts overwhelmingly find standing in suits involving claims of 
intentional trespass even though there is generally no physical or 
noticeable harm involved. This is because “[t]he law infers some damage 
from every direct entry upon the land of another.”89 In Jacque  
v. Steenberg Homes, despite multiple objections from plaintiff 
homeowner, a mobile home selling company intentionally trespassed 
across private land.90 Though traveling through plaintiff’s field resulted 
in only nominal physical damages, the court found that a punitive 
damages award of $100,000 against the mobile home company was 
reasonable.91 The court maintained that individuals have a “legal right to 
exclude others from private property” and that this right would be 
“hollow if the legal system provide[d] insufficient means to protect it.”92 
If not for the longstanding notion of protecting property interests, 
the court’s holding in Jacque would be hard pressed to satisfy the 
standing requirements of Article III. If property interests were taken out 
of the equation, the only injury to plaintiff would have been a damaged 
 
 85. Leichtman v. WLW Jacor Commc’ns, Inc., 634 N.E.2d 697, 698 (Ohio Ct. App. 1994). 
 86. Id. 
 87. Id. at 699. 
 88. Gertz v. Robert Welch, 418 U.S. 323, 380 (1974). 
 89. Jacque v. Steenberg Homes, 563 N.W.2d 154, 160 (Wis. 1997). 
 90. Id. at 609. 
 91. Id. at 610. 
 92. Id. at 618. 
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ego. “I told them not to do it, and they did it anyway,” is not a very 
compelling basis for standing purposes. The point here is not to discredit 
how the standing doctrine is currently applied to intentional trespass 
suits, but rather to embrace the analogy of the harm suffered in those 
cases to the harm suffered in consumer data breach suits. Similar to the 
harm incurred from an intentional trespass, individuals whose personal 
information is taken or used without permission immediately suffer an 
injury-in-fact. 
Confidential details of a person’s life can be obtained in a data 
breach. As shown throughout our nation’s jurisprudence, privacy is a 
right ratified in a number of statutes.93 One notable example is Article I, 
section 1 of California’s Constitution, which states that the pursuit and 
obtainment of privacy is an inalienable right.94 This right to privacy is not 
limited to states, as the right to privacy has been implied throughout the 
federal Constitutionmost notably in the Fourth Amendment.95 In the 
consumer data breach context, the federal Stored Communications Act 
prevents electronic communication providers from handing over a 
consumer’s private information except for clearly defined exceptions.96 
This statute serves to show that consumers do not give up their property 
or privacy rights to a company just by using their services. And like 
battery, slander per se, and trespass, the harm that accrues may not be 
seen on the surface. When an individual’s right to property or right to 
privacy has been infringed upon, there is harm regardless of whether the 
personal data has been used. 
2.   Actual Financial Harm 
Knowing that a breach has occurred certainly causes time and 
expense because the victim must monitor and take steps to minimize the 
risk, such as reissuing credit cards, putting stop orders on payments, or 
fearing credit-report impacts. Take, for example, the risk of identity theft. 
It has been reported that “[t]he most commonly alleged injury in the 
wake of a data breach is an increased risk of future identity theft.”97 If a 
bank were to call a customer and say that the customer’s credit card 
information had been stolen, but that the card has not yet been used 
anywhere, it is unlikely that the customer would just go about her day 
 
 93. See, e.g., 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. (2015). 
 94. CAL. CONST. art. I, § 1; see also ALASKA CONST. art. I, § 22 (“The right of the people to privacy 
is recognized and shall not be infringed.”); FLA. CONST. art. I, § 23; MONT. CONST. art. II, § 10 (“The 
right of individual privacy is essential to the well-being of a free society and shall not be 
infringed . . . .”). 
 95. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347, 353 (1967); U.S. CONST. amend. IV. 
 96. 18 U.S.C. § 2701 et seq. 
 97. Robert D. Fram et al., Standing in Data Breach Cases: A Review of Recent Trends, 
BLOOMBERG (Nov. 9, 2015), https://www.bna.com/standing-data-breach-n57982063308 (citation 
omitted).  
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content with that knowledge. Indeed, the customer would be reasonably 
inclined to immediately cancel her credit card. And for the next few 
months, the customer likely would monitor her other accounts. This is 
because, when a data breach occurs, victims carry objectively reasonable 
beliefs that the information has landed in the wrong hands for purposes 
of misuse. Simply put, when it comes to consumer data breaches, there 
is nothing “speculative” about the incurred harm. 
At the very least, victims of a data breach have to take the time to 
cancel and obtain new credit cards. This undeniably derails business 
dealings or time-sensitive purchases. Moreover, during this time, 
consumers likely are not able to use their accounts. Furthermore, it is 
likely that these consumers will have to change all of their online records 
of bank account or credit card information stored in the various websites 
we all use. The loss of time and money associated with a breach is an 
actual financial harm, and currently, courts are not recognizing this 
under Clapper. 
3.   Actual Psychological Harm 
Even without the loss of time and money, there is a more basic 
harmthe invasion of privacy itself. On its own, a breach constitutes a 
sufficient harm for standing purposes because of the presumed 
psychological harms associated with it. There is actual harm at the breach 
stage, regardless of whether there is evidence that the obtained data was 
improperly “used.” Though for the most part, psychological harm has 
already been a basis for satisfying the injury in fact element for consumer 
data breach suits, the importance of acknowledging this type of harm 
bears repeating. “If [a] plaintiff can show that there is a possibility that 
[a] defendant’s conduct may have a future effect, even if the injury has 
not yet occurred, the court may hold that standing has been satisfied.”98 
To illustrate this point, in many states, “an entry alone is sufficient” 
for an act to be considered burglary.99 Imagine coming home from work 
and finding your front door ajar. After either calling the police or bravely 
self-investigating the premises, you determine that a stranger has 
definitely been inside your home, but that it is unclear whether anything 
has actually been taken. At this moment, you are likely unnerved because 
someone has been inside your home without your permission; a home 
you originally thought of as secure. Thoughts encapsulate you. If this 
person was able to get into your home once, what is to stop them from 
obtaining access again? Better yet, did they take something that you just 
cannot pinpoint at this moment? For a court to say that you have not been 
 
 98. CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FED. PRAC. & PROC. CIV. § 1785.1 (3d ed. 2005). 
 99. People v. Davis, 18 Cal. 4th 712, 720–21 (Cal. 1998) (discussing the “entry” element under 
California’s definition of burglary). 
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harmed in this hypothetical situation would be ludicrous.100 Aside from 
the obvious psychological effects, your legal rights to privacy and 
property have been violated. 
A 2015 study into the psychological trauma experienced by data 
breach victims found that identity theft victims often experience 
emotions similar to those of trauma survivors or persons who have been 
victims of a home invasion or assault.101 As such, just as a court would 
not let a burglar go free just because a homeowner cannot prove 
something was taken, courts in consumer data breach suits should not 
dismiss cases by applying standards that are inadequate in the data 
breach context. Like seeing the front door of one’s home ajar, the theft of 
personal data affects a person in a myriad of ways that are not simply 
tangible or seen on the surface. 
It is objectively reasonable for a person to become distressed upon 
hearing that personal details about them have been breached. When a 
person’s credit card is stolen, that person reasonably might respond by 
feeling worried, scared, angry, or stressed. Having to worry, because of a 
breach, that you might not be able to pay rent, or buy diapers, can 
seriously take a toll on a person’s wellbeing. To put this in perspective, 
stress alone has been linked to the six leading causes of death: heart 
disease, cancer, lung ailments, accidents, cirrhosis of the liver and 
suicide.102 It is not necessary to nitpick in determining what likelihood of 
psychological harm is sufficient for standing purposes, because as 
addressed previously, psychological harm is but one of many harms 
inflicted as a result of a data breach. Though the psychological effects can 
and likely will differ from individual to individual, this does not change 
the fact that there is always a possibility that a breach could negatively 
affect the mental health of a person. As such, psychological harm is an 
injury-in-fact that should be considered actual harm for standing 
purposes. 
III.  COUNTERARGUMENTS 
One argument against this Note’s proposed thesis is that the 
standing doctrine’s purpose is to conserve judicial resources rather than 
broaden federal jurisdiction. The idea is that if plaintiffs are able to bring 
suits without showing that a sufficient injury has occurred, judicial 
resources will be spread too thin hearing claims that are miniscule, 
 
 100. For an infographic that shines a light on how victims of burglaries have been psychologically 
affected, see The Psychological Effects of Burglary: Infographic, VERISURE (June  
11, 2016), blog.verisure.co.uk/psychological-effects-of-burglary. 
 101. EQUIFAX, A LASTING IMPACT: THE EMOTIONAL TOLL OF IDENTITY THEFT (2015), 
https://www.equifax.com/assets/PSOL/15-9814_psol_emotionalToll_wp.pdf. 
 102. Deborah S. Hartz-Seeley, Chronic Stress Is Linked to the Six Leading Causes of Death, MIAMI 
HERALD (Mar. 21, 2014, 11:53 AM), www.miamiherald.com/living/article1961770.html.  
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frivolous, or otherwise unwarranted. Courts want to reserve their 
resources for cases where there is truly a need for judicial facilitation. 
This Note respects this contention and does not attempt here to discredit 
the importance of preserving judicial resources. It is true that 
implementation of this proposed understanding of actual harm allows 
more consumers to seek redress. However, though more suits will be 
brought, this only means that justice is finally being afforded individuals 
who will now be able to have their cases heard on the merits. This Note 
does not suggest that all claims will be found to have merit once 
adjudicated. Rather, this Note simply calls for an understanding of 
injury-in-fact that will afford actually harmed victims of consumer data 
breaches the opportunity to finally be heard on the merits. 
Opponents to this Note’s proposed standing interpretation may 
argue that consumers currently seek redress from companies rather than 
the attackers who triggered the breach, and that this proposed standing 
definition would hurt defendant companies. It is true that this proposed 
understanding creates a burden on companies to constantly work to 
protect the confidential information of consumers. However, just 
because one partyhere, the attackerscan be sued, does not mean that 
other culpable partiessuch as the defendant companiesshould not be 
held accountable for their own failures. Data collectors are under a legal 
obligation to keep customer data secure103 and should be held 
accountable under the law when they fail to do so. Furthermore, this 
proposed understanding will force entities to actively seek out new ways 
to fully protect the private information provided by consumers. 
To illustrate this point, one only need look back to the defendant 
entity in Storm. There, the breach occurred on April 7, 2014; the 
defendant entity did not discover the breach until 23 days after the 
breach occurred, and, more importantly, the defendant entity did not 
begin notifying plaintiff consumers until almost two weeks after the 
company discovered the breach.104 Under the proposed interpretation of 
what constitutes an actual harm in consumer data breach suits outlined 
in this Note, the severe oversight and unacceptable delay in notification 
by defendant entity in Storm would likely not have occurred. Instead, 
defendant entities, knowing that a breach will give rise to litigation, will 
likely spend more time and resources monitoring and finding further 
ways to protect consumer information. 
 
 103. Depending on the type of entity and data, there are a number of regulations in place that 
require entities to provide reasonable security for sensitive information. See, e.g., 15 U.S.C. § 1681 
(2017) (referred to as the Fair Credit Reporting Act); 12 U.S.C. § 1828b (1999) (referred to as the 
Gramm-Leach-Bliley Act). 
 104. Storm v. Paytime, Inc., 90 F. Supp. 3d 359, 363 (M.D. Pa. 2015). 
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IV.  REFORMING THE CASE LAW 
As shown throughout this Note, courts are incorrectly applying 
Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard to the consumer data breach 
context. By applying this “certainly impending” standard, these courts 
are neglecting very real harms suffered by consumers. The new 
understanding of injury in consumer data breach cases proposed by this 
Note serves to prevent this continued injustice. To illustrate this new 
understanding’s effect, the Second Circuit’s opinion in Whalen, applying 
Clapper, held that credit-monitoring costs were not a sufficient harm.105 
Under this Note’s proposed standing interpretation, the plaintiff in 
Whalen would not have had her case dismissed for lack of standing. 
Instead, the suit would have been adjudged on the merits of the case. 
Though it is uncertain whether a judge or jury would have ultimately 
found the defendant company liable, at least the plaintiff in Whalen 
would have had her day in court. 
Likewise, in Storm, the Third Circuitin adhering to the “certainly 
impending” standard of Clapperexpressly overlooked a plaintiff who 
had suffered very real harm by having to spend additional costs and 
hours commuting to a separate location for work.106 There, the data 
breach made it so he could no longer use his government security 
clearance.107 This injustice would not have occurred under the standing 
interpretation proposed by this Note. This is because in Storm, actual 
financial harm, psychological harm, and risk of future injury were all 
evident. Under the standard proposed by this Note, plaintiffs in Storm 
would have had their case heard and adjudged on the merits. 
Though cases like In re Adobe, Remijas, and Galaria did not adhere 
to Clapper’s “certainly impending” standard, the courts there were only 
able to satisfy standing by finding impressive ways to distinguish Clapper 
from the consumer data breach context. Under this Note’s theory of 
standing, these courts would not have had to work so hard. These courts 
all found standing to be satisfied by acknowledging some of the actual 
harms addressed in this Note, however, none of these courts went so far 
as to list as extensively the plethora of harms that should satisfy the 
injury-in-fact element of standing in the realm of consumer data breach 
cases. Instead of grasping to one type of harm as these cases did, this new 
understanding of what constitutes a sufficient injury-in-fact in consumer 
data breach suits comes with an arsenal of understood actual harms that 
will pass standing inspection. 
If the nearsighted Clapper standard ceases to apply to consumer 
data breach suits, the question of standing in Spokeo will be an  
 
 105. Whalen v. Michael Stores Inc., 153 F. Supp. 3d 577, 581 (E.D.N.Y. 2015) (applying Clapper  
v. Amnesty Int’l USA, 133 S. Ct. 1138, 1147 (2013). 
 106. Storm, 90 F. Supp. 3d at 363. 
 107. Id. 
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open-and-shut case upon its return to the Ninth Circuit. There, the court 
will find that Robins was sufficiently harmed when Spokeo listed false 
information about him. However, until the Supreme Court revisits the 
matter, the “certainly impending” standard will continue to create 
uncertainty as to whether a person who has actually been harmed will 
satisfy the injury-in-fact element of standing. 
CONCLUSION 
This Note illuminates how courts are currently misapplying one 
element of the standing doctrinespecifically the injury-in-fact 
elementto the particular context of consumer data breach suits. 
Further, this Note serves to call upon courts to re-evaluate what 
constitutes an actual harm in the consumer data breach context. Though 
this Note likely does not exhaust all of the actual harms incurred by 
consumers upon a data breach, it does serve to highlight certain common 
and undeniable actual harms. These harms include increased risk of 
future harm, presumed harm, financial harm associated with the breach 
itself, and psychological harm. This proposed interpretation 
acknowledges these very real harms, where current standards have failed 
to do so. The interpretation further serves to protect and compensate 
consumers who have suffered these real harms. Lastly, by placing the 
burden on companies, this proposed interpretation incentivizes these 
entities to take stronger measures to protect consumers, by constantly 
seeking better ways of preventing the theft of private information. 
 
